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Abstract
We study the role of gender beliefs for cooperation in a public goods
game experiment. Controlling for risk preferences and for subjects’ uncon-
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1 Introduction
Gender beliefs can be defined as different interpretations and expectations about
the personality traits (how women and men are) and behavior (how women
and men behave) of men and women. Moreover, gender beliefs are not only
descriptive, but also prescriptive, stating how women and men should be and
should behave (Heilman, 2001). Gender beliefs might affect behavior and lead
to gender discrimination, positive or negative, via the impact these norms have
on the agent’s expectations.
∗Radboud University Nijmegen, Institute for Management Research, Department of Eco-
nomics, Nijmegen, The Netherlands; and Tilburg University, Department of Economics,
Tilburg, The Netherlands.
†International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Hague.
‡Please send all comments to Jana Vyrastekova, Radboud University Nijmegen, In-
stitute for Management Research, Department of Economics, P.O. Box 9108, NL-6500
HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands. Tel: +31-24-361 1588, Fax: 31-24-361 2379, E—mail:
J.Vyrastekova@fm.ru.nl.
1
Previous experimental evidence on the economic impact of gender norms
focused mainly on competitive environments. Men and women were found to
react differently to payment schemes based on competition, and the differences
can be at least partially attributed to the impact of expectations about the
behavior of the other gender. Behavior in cooperative environments begs the
same curiosity: does information of gender group composition add information
that is taken as relevant by the interacting agents - and acted upon? For the
purpose of this paper we rephrase this question more specific as: does informa-
tion on group composition in terms of gender affect cooperation of groups in
public goods games? The answer to this question is inconclusive so far, despite
the bulk of literature, directly or indirectly related to it.
Contradictory observations can be found in the literature (Eckel and Gross-
man, 2000), indicating either that women are more cooperative than men , or
that there is no gender difference, or that women are less cooperative than men.
There seem to be at least one unifying theme identified on how gender mat-
ters in games where cooperation would affect the economic outcomes. Women
seem to behave more prosocially - cooperatively - in games where no risk is at
stake, i.e. in dictator games (Eckel and Grossman, 1998 and 2000). In these
environments, the role of gender norms has been documents as well. Dana,
Cain and Dawes (2005) ran dictator games in order to test for the influence of
beliefs about fairness on the generosity of dictators in one shot games. They
recognized both an influence of beliefs in fairness, leading to positive propos-
als, and of beliefs in standard economic rationality when students had received
economic training, leading to zero proposals. They therefore concluded that
“the interesting aspects of generosity demonstrated by our studies cannot be
adequately formalized without somehow incorporating beliefs into the decision
maker’s utility function” (idem, p. 200). Another paper on the role of beliefs in
dictator games focused on gender beliefs (Aguiar, Branas-Garza, Cobo-Reyes,
Jimenez, and Miller, 2008). This experiment revealed that female receivers
more often than male receivers prefer to play against a female dictator when
offered the choice between a female and a male dictator: 80% of the women
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chose for a female dictator whereas only 48% of the men opted for a female
dictator. This result suggests that women have stronger gender beliefs about
generosity/altruism than men. The authors, however, as in many other articles
in experimental economics which find gender differences, do not provide any
explanation for these differences. In a recent overview of gender differences in
experimental economics, Croson and Gneezy (2009) argue that women’s deci-
sions are more context-specific than men’s. For example, they conclude from
studies on the ultimatum game and the prisoner’s dilemma game that women’s
decisions vary more with the gender of their partner than men’s decisions, in-
dicating that also gender context is more influential for women as compared to
men. But they offer no explanation why this would be the case.
In this paper, we focus on the role of gender in formulating beliefs about
the (expected) behavior of others. The relevance of the group composition thus
becomes central in our understanding of the rates of cooperation in the public
goods game. We control for factors which might affect the players of both gen-
ders, and which have previously been linked to gender differences. These are risk
preferences on one hand, and unconditional pro-social preferences on the other
hand. Risk preferences may affect behavior in a social dilemma for conditional
cooperators, who are uncertain about the behavior of others. Cooperation can
be then seen as a gamble taken on the cooperativeness level of others. Will a
cooperative behavior result in a sucker’s position? Or will it result in a mutu-
ally profitable cooperation over long run? Moreover, we need to control for risk
preferences as female subjects have been previously found more risk averse than
male subjects in experimental studies (Eckel and Grossman, 2002).
Conditional cooperation is pervasive and documented extensively in public
goods games (see Fischbacher et al 2002). Cooperation of conditionally co-
operative individuals depends on the beliefs about the cooperation of others.
Gender norms might affect the type of beliefs subjects hold, depending on the
gender composition of the interacting group members. We propose that gender
beliefs might provide an escape route from the negative impact of uncertainty
in the problem of cooperation faced by female individuals in a public goods
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problem. This would take place as the information on the presence of female
co-participants in an all-female public goods game group alleviates the uncer-
tainty about the cooperation of others via gender norms.
This hypothesis we test experimentally, by first measuring risk-aversion and
pro-social preferences of our participants, and then observing their behavior in
a repeated public goods game in which we announced the group composition
to the groups. We form either all-male or all-female groups, and moreover, we
sort the groups by the risk preferences of their members. We form risk averse
and risk neutral groups. Our gender belief hypothesis predicts that especially
risk-averse female groups will succeed to cooperate better than their counter
part risk-averse male groups, and that this is due to gender beliefs.
2 Hypothesis and experimental design
We hypothesize that gender beliefs affecting behavior in strategic situations by
shaping the expectations of the interacting players will have an impact on the
cooperation rates in the public goods games where the gender of homogenous
groups is revealed to the subjects. Gender beliefs affect expectations and be-
havior depending on the composition of the group of interacting agents. As
females are considered/expected to be more cooperative than males, receiving
information on the homogenous group composition would shape differently the
expectations in the all-male than in the all-female groups. Revealing group com-
position in the all-female groups in a public goods game decreases the strategic
risk of cooperation, and hence lead to more cooperation than in the all-male
groups:
Hypothesis: (Gender norms and cooperation) Female subjects are believed to
be more cooperative (and in particular by other female subjects). Hence,
information on group composition in homogeneous groups results, after
controlling for risk-preferences and for pro-social preferences, in higher
levels of cooperation in all-female groups than in all-male groups.
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We test our hypothesis experimentally. Subjects of our experiment were 42
students of business and economics of Tilburg University (TU), The Nether-
lands1 . We collected information on each subject on two occasions. Up to one
week prior to the main experiment, each subject participated in a laboratory
pre-experiment elicitation of risk preferences (using the Holt&Laury instrument)
and an elicitation of unconditional social preferences (using the decomposed
game technique, Messick, D. M. and McClintock, 1968; see also Offerman et
al 1996), in this order. These experimEnts were conducted as single-person
decision problems (although with payoff impact of an anonymously selected ex-
periment participant in the part eliciting social preferences), and were conducted
using the NetQ questionnaire facility. Each subject could login to the program
at home, and complete the questionnaire. We recorded the duration of the ex-
periment, in order to control for unduly short or long sessions. No feedback on
the outcome of these auxiliary experiments was given to the subjects prior to
finishing the main experiment, in order to avoid any spill-over effects. We then
conducted two laboratory sessions, each consisting of 21 students, implementing
our main experiment. The sessions lasted cca. 1 hour.
At the end of the laboratory session, subjects were paid for participating in
the pre-experiment and for the main experiment; on average they earned 22.80
Euros.2 The language used in the experiments was English, and they were
partially computerized and conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
One experimental design issue we have to address is the way we informed
subjects about the gender. One possible point of concern is that this might lead
to experimenter demand effect. Holm (2000) addressed this issue by comparing
this explicit method of gender announcement with a more subtle one (first-
name announcements). They found no qualitative differences in the data in
the two treatments. We follow their conclusions and use the direct gender
announcement in the experiment, avoiding possible anonymity issues among
1This paper reports data on the first batch of our experiments. Obviously, more data and
replication is needed to check the robustness of our findings.
2 Instructions for the experiment can be found at the following webpage:
http://www.ru.nl/economie/contact_en/medewerkers/volledige_lijst_van/vyrastekova/.
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the students participants due to announcing first names.
2.1 Social preferences
Gender effects have been documented, mostly finding females to be more co-
operative in nonstrategic environments. We control for this aspect of gender
differences by measuring each subjects unconditional willingness to cooperate,
using a decomposed game technique (Messick, D. M. and McClintock, 1968; see
also Offerman et al 1996). This method consist of 24 pairs of payoffs, each of
them affecting the payoff of the deciding subject and of one anonymous other
subject in the experiment. These payoffs are obtained as equidistant coordi-
nates on a circle, with a fixed diameter (corresponding to 150 cents in our case).
Each payoff pair is a pair of two neighboring points on the circle. The choice
between two payoffs represents on either the possibility to increase the payoff of
the other person at a cost to the deciding player; or the possibility to decrease
the payoff of the other person at a cost to the deciding player. By asking an
individual to perform several such considerations, a robustness (or randomness)
of such individual choice can be measured. Moreover, the sum of all individ-
ual payoff choices results in an average "inclination of a person, willingness to
increase/decrease/or ignore the payoff consequences for the other person. Such
inclination, indeed "type of prosocial orientation" can be then measured by the
angle of this final payoff vector. Subjects with payoff vector with angle close
to 0 (corresponding to the individually rational choice of keeping all money for
oneself and neither increase nor decrease other’s payoff) are categorized as the
rational payoff maximizers. Subjects with a positive angle (above 5 degrees) are
categorized as altruistic individuals, and subjects with a negative angle (below
minus 5 degrees) are categorized as spiteful individuals.
2.2 Risk preferences
We measured risk preferences using a standard tool developed by Holt and
Laury (2002). Each subject had to choose one of two lotteries (alternatives)
offered in eight decision Situations, see Figure 1. These choices allow us to
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Situation 1: Alternative A: 1/10 cards with prize 200 cents and 9/10 cards with prize 160 cents
Alternative B: 1/10 cards with prize 385 cents and 9/10 cards with prize 10 cents
Situation 2: Alternative A: 2/10 cards with prize 200 cents and 8/10 cards with prize 160 cents
Alternative B: 2/10 cards with prize 385 cents and 8/10 cards with prize 10 cents
Situation 3: Alternative A: 3/10 cards with prize 200 cents and 7/10 cards with prize 160 cents
Alternative B: 3/10 cards with prize 385 cents and 7/10 cards with prize 10 cents
Situation 4: Alternative A: 4/10 cards with prize 200 cents and 6/10 cards with prize 160 cents
Alternative B: 4/10 cards with prize 385 cents and 6/10 cards with prize 10 cents
Situation 5: Alternative A: 5/10 cards with prize 200 cents and 5/10 cards with prize 160 cents
Alternative B: 5/10 cards with prize 385 cents and 5/10 cards with prize 10 cents
Situation 6: Alternative A: 6/10 cards with prize 200 cents and 4/10 cards with prize 160 cents
Alternative B: 6/10 cards with prize 385 cents and 4/10 cards with prize 10 cents
Situation 7: Alternative A: 7/10 cards with prize 200 cents and 3/10 cards with prize 160 cents
Alternative B: 7/10 cards with prize 385 cents and 3/10 cards with prize 10 cents
Situation 8: Alternative A: 8/10 cards with prize 200 cents and 2/10 cards with prize 160 cents
Alternative B: 8/10 cards with prize 385 cents and 2/10 cards with prize 10 cents
Situation 9: Alternative A: 9/10 cards with prize 200 cents and 1/10 cards with prize 160 cents
Alternative B: 9/10 cards with prize 385 cents and 1/10 cards with prize 10 cents
Situation 10: Alternative A: 10/10 cards with prize 200 cents
Alternative B: 10/10 cards with prize 385 cents
Figure 1: Lotteries List Eliciting Risk Preferences (Holt and Laury, 2002).
categorize subjects’ risk preferences. Starting from Situation 1, alternative B
would be chosen only by an individual willing to accept a considerable risk. A
risk-neutral person would prefer alternative A over alternative B in Situations
1 to 4, after that, however, she would switch to alternative B. The later an
individual switches to choosing Alternative B after Situation 4, the stronger is
the aversion to risk she reveals. Eventually, in situation 10, all rational and
payoff incentivized individuals should switch to B. We therefore characterize a
subject by the number of times he/she chooses alternative A before switching
to alternative B. We exclude from categorization the individuals who switch
between alternative A and choosing alternative B several times. Table 1 contains
the number of individuals in each category, per gender.
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Number of "A " choices (risk type) # Male # Female
3 (RN) 1 3
4 (RN) 8 6
5 (RA) 3 5
6 (RA) 6 6
7 (RA) 1 0
8 (RA) 0 1
9 (RA) 1 0
Not categorized 1 0
Table 1: Risk Preference Types by Gender.
2.3 Public goods game with information on gender com-
position
We used a standard linear public goods game in order to model the cooperation
in social dilemma. Three subjects were matched into a group and received and
endowment of 15 tokens each, to choose to invest into the joint project (public
good) with return of 0.6 points per token in the joint project, or keep for oneself,
with return of 1 point per token in the private project. One point was worth 5
cents. Subjects participated in 11 rounds of interaction. In round 1, we elicited
their contributions schedule - a complete strategy for the public goods game.
We did not provide any feedback on decisions made in round 1, until the end
of the experiment. In rounds 2-11, subjects participated in the repeated public
goods game. In round 2, we additionally provided the information about the
gender group composition. One sentence on the screen informed subjects that
"all subjects in the group are of the same gender", either female or male, as
appropriate for the relevant groups. Besides using gender pairing as a treat-
ment variable, we also sorted our groups by risk-aversion, as measured in the
pre-experiments. Sum of the individual risk-aversion measures as determined
by the number of A choices in the risk elicitation tool did not exceed 12 in
groups denoted as RN, i.e. groups were composed only of risk neutral or risk
taking individuals. Groups composed of risk averse individuals, with the sum
exceeding 12, are the groups denoted by RA. We sorted groups in such a way
that the individual groups members did not differ from each other in terms of
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the risk-aversion measure too much (at most by 1 step, whenever possible). We
hypothesized that the information on gender composition would, due to gender
beliefs, remove strategic risk in the all-female groups. Consequently, we expect
that the impact of gender beliefs would be higher in groups where individuals
are more risk-averse than in groups with lower risk-aversion.
3 Data analysis
Figure 2 presents the individual average contributions, by gender and by the
group aversion type assigned to the group. Here, group aversion type is either
RN or RA where RN stands for risk-neutral/risk taking and RA stands for risk
averse. Groups with the type RA consist of individuals who switched to the
more volatile alternative B at a later stage than a risk-neutral individual would
(i.e. in later than in Situation 4). Remaining groups are of type RN. Although
the group differences are not extremely large, it is the case that the risk-averse
type female groups achieve the highest cooperation rates in the long run, in the
last round of the experiment.
We estimated the individual contributions strategy in the following way3 .
A variable to be explained is the individual’s change in own contribution be-
tween rounds t-1 and t. As explanatory variables, we used the two preferences
characteristics of the subject: the social preference type (being either spiteful,
with value -1, individualistic, with value 0, or cooperative, with value 1) and
risk-preference type (being either risk taking or neutral, with value -1, or, being
risk averse, with value 1). We also include a freerider indicator, equal to 1 if
the subjects contributed less than others on average in the previous round t-1,
and equal to 0 otherwise.
We estimated a random effects Tobit model, censored at the maximal and
minimal possible adjustment of individual contributions, see Table 2. The ad-
3When we abuse the reality of repeated interaction, and consider an individual contribution
per round as an independent observation, then we find that risk-taking females take more "risk
", i.e. cooperate more, than male groups composed of risk-taking individuals, (MWU, p=0.087
one-sided; Kolmogorov Smirnov test p=0.055), while risk-averse men and women contribute
on average the same amounts (MWU, p=0.121 one-sided; Kolmogorov Smirnov test, p=0.099
).
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Figure 2: Individual Average Contributions in Female (fem) and Male (male)
Groups, and in Risk Averse Groups (RA) and Risk Neutral/Risk Taking Groups
(RN).
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social type 2.875***
(1.010)
social type*gender -2.498**
(1.225)
risk preference type -2.509
(1.544 )
risk preference type*gender 3.608*
(2.088)
gender 0.909
(0.909)
others contribution in t-1 -0.095
(0.041)
being freerider in t-1 4.985***
(0.071)
constant -4.770***
(0.972)
N 0.336
Log Likelihood -479.50352
Table 2: Explaining Change in Individual i′s Contribution Between Period t−1
and Period t by a Censored Tobit model with Individual Random Effects.
justment of own contribution to the public good between period t-1 and t de-
pends in an expected way on the individual preference characteristics: cooper-
ative types increase contributions more and risk-averse types increase less than
their counterparts. Interactions with gender are supporting our hypothesis.
Interacting risk-preferences with gender, we find that risk-averse female types
increase their contributors more than risk-averse male types. Consequently, the
information on the group gender composition mitigates the risk-aversion of fe-
males towards being more cooperative, and this effect is stronger than when
males are informed about the homogenous the gender composition. This obser-
vation is in line with our gender belief hypothesis formulated above.
4 Discussion and conclusions
Our experiments have accounted for social preferences and risk aversion in or-
der to assess whether gender differences in cooperative behavior in a repeated
public goods game should be entirely attributed to gender differences in these
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individual preference measures, or whether cooperative behavior is also affected
at the social level, namely by gender beliefs. By forming purely male and female
groups in the experiments, and by revealing the group composition to the par-
ticipants, we have shown that there seems indeed to be an influence of gender
beliefs on strategic behavior in the public goods game. Female subjects react
more cooperatively than men in our experiments, and this impact is particularly
relevant in groups composed of risk-averse female subjects. We have hypothe-
sized this impact of announcing the group gender composition, by supposing
that informing females on homogenous female groups amounts to removing the
uncertainty with respect to the unconditional prosocial preferences of the co-
players. This decreased risk, due to the information on gender composition, is
then reflected in a higher level of cooperativeness of female rather than male
subjects - when accounting for their risk preferences.
Our explanation of these gender differences that we found in our public
goods experiment is based on the literature in sociology, gender studies, and
social psychology on gender beliefs. The differences in gender beliefs about men
and women can be summarized around achievement-oriented traits for men —
agentic traits — and service-oriented traits for women — communal traits (idem).
This leads to the prescriptive gender belief about women “that women should
be nurturing and service-oriented (communal), but not tough and achievement-
oriented (agentic)” (idem, p. 667). Both descriptive and prescriptive dimen-
sions of gender beliefs contribute to individual self-definitions as masculine or
feminine, and operate at the interpersonal level. “In the broader social psy-
chological context, gender beliefs contribute to individuals’ definitions of their
self-schemas, social identities, and self-evaluations. Gender beliefs also operate
in the interpersonal domain, defining the behaviours that are appropriate to
various social contexts, influencing individuals’ expectations for and interpreta-
tions of others’ behavior, and guiding the manner in which people interact with
members of their own and the other gender” (Whitley and Ægisdóttir, 2000:
962).
The empirical literature on gender beliefs has widely demonstrated that both
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men and women hold gender beliefs. In particular, they both believe that men
are more agentic and should behave more agentic than women, and that women
are more communal and should behave more communal than men (Heilman,
2001). This is also confirmed for specific roles and behaviours, such as lead-
ership: both men and women characterize leadership in general as masculine,
whereas when they are asked to characterize particular elements of leadership,
they both tend to identify structure as a masculine trait of leadership and con-
sideration as a feminine trait of leadership (Johanson, 2008). Most empirical
studies find that men hold stronger gender beliefs than women, and that beliefs
about masculinity tend to be stronger than those about femininity (Baber and
Jenkins Tucker, 2006; Smiler and Gelman, 2008). However, studies on specific
contexts do not always confirm this general result, for example in the case of
leadership: men and women tend to hold equally strong gender beliefs about
leadership (Johanson, 2008). The general finding that men hold stronger gen-
der beliefs and that the gender beliefs about masculinity tend to be stronger
than those on femininity suggest that masculinity is more narrowly defined than
femininity ad that men tend to be more essentializing than women (Smiler and
Gelman, 2008). This gender difference in gender beliefs has been explained by
social dominance theory and expectation states theory, which argue that be-
cause men tend to have on average a higher socio-economic status than women
and they want to preserve that advantaged position, it is in their interest to
hold on more strongly to traditional stereotypes about gender roles and traits
compared to women (Whitley and Ægisdóttir, 2000; Ridgeway, 2001; Gerber,
2009). Cecilia Ridgeway has pointed out how status beliefs interact with gender
beliefs so that even when individuals do not endorse dominant status beliefs,
their recognition that these beliefs are widely shared will lead them to assume
that others will treat them according to those beliefs, which will in turn affect
their own behavior in a stereotype way.
Gender beliefs are rather essentialist of character, in the sense that they
change only very slowly and are often reproduced in new contexts, for example
becoming attached to newly emerging jobs in the labour market. This resilience
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of gender beliefs may signal an evolutionary origin. The dominant evolution-
ary explanation is through sex selection theory, which holds that men are by
nature more competitive because, having many sperm, they want to maximize
their number of offspring, whereas women, having only a few eggs, are more
cooperative so they seek to maximize the quality of their offspring. This would
explain why males exhibit more dominance behavior than females, both among
animals and among humans, according to Browne (1998), and they compete
with each other for access to females. Recently, however, sex selection the-
ory has received serious criticisms, within biology, psychology and the social
sciences. For example, Adovasio, Soffer and Page (2007) have shown in an his-
torical anthropological study that the idea of men as the proactive providers
and women as the passive reproductive machinery of society is not confirmed
by recent evidence on women’s roles in prehistorical times. Artifacts such as
baskets, sculptures, and tools as well as features of agriculture suggest that
women were just as active, innovative and productive as men in prehistory and
they argue that there is no evidence that men and women behaved in consis-
tently different ways when it comes to cooperation. An internal critique, from
biology, comes from Joan Roughgarden (2004) who shows internal inconsisten-
cies in Darwin’s sexual selection theory and the adaptation of this theory in
evolutionary psychology. She proposes instead social selection theory based on
the need for both males and females to cooperate in order to ensure that off-
spring will be raised. In a recent article, Roughgarden, Oishi, and Akçay (2006)
present social selection theory through a cooperative bargaining game frame-
work, showing that animals cooperate to rear (and not only produce) the largest
number of offspring possible, because offspring are investments held in common
between males and females. A third critique on a sexual selection explanation
of gender beliefs is provided by Shelly Taylor (2001) who, like Roughgarden,
argues that sex differences originate from the need for cooperation, while recog-
nizing that among primates this seems to be a stronger characteristic among
females than males. She explains this difference, however, not through biology
but through socialization of women into closer friendships and networks around
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food provisioning, childcare and defence against roaming young males, and the
socialization of men into hierarchical groups which function best for tasks such
as defence, attack and hunting. Therefore, Taylor argues, women tend to prefer
to befriend other women and female friends have closer ties than male friends.
Men’s groups therefore are more often threatened by power plays around dom-
inance and control, Taylor argues, and one of the consequences of these power
plays is the exclusion of young aggressive males from groups, who then start
roaming around. This explanation of the origins of gender beliefs around agen-
tic and communal traits leads us to a social constructivist perspective, which
holds that gender beliefs are produced in social and historical contexts rather
than inherent to individuals’ sex. The social constructivist perspective includes
various gender theories, of which the gender role theory and social domination
theory are the best known.
Our experiment does not allow us to distinguish between nature and nurture
as explanations for gender beliefs. But the literature and our findings suggest
that social context rather than biology seems to be a more convincing explana-
tion. As indicated by Ridgeway (2001), the interaction between status beliefs
and gender beliefs through expectation status theory is especially likely in co-
operative, goals-oriented contexts in which group status beliefs become salient.
Moreover, she states, “. . . the theory argues that gender status beliefs become
effectively salient (i.e., sufficiently salient to measurably affect task behavior and
evaluation) when gender either distinguishes between actors in a situation . . .
or is linked by cultural beliefs to the task or goals they face” (Ridgeway, 2001:
643). A public goods game centres around cooperation, a typical feminine trait
according to commonly held gender beliefs, as we have reviewed above. Hence,
the task in our experiment was not gender-neutral but positively linked to a
feminine gender belief, which allowed for the expression of behavior in relation
to the intrapersonal level of gender beliefs: one’s own behavior independently
of others. The other social context provided in our experiment was information
about the sex of one’s partners, which allowed for the expression of behavior in
relation to the interpersonal level of gender beliefs: one’s behavior in relation
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to one’s expectation of the behavior of others. So, in our experiment we had a
cooperative context (task), which is in line with a feminine gender belief, and
a gender context provided as treatment variable (information that the other
players are female or male). This experimental setting allows us to explain the
results in terms of interpersonal gender beliefs and intrapersonal gender beliefs.
First, we find that the female subjects in our experiment behaved more co-
operatively than men, when corrected for differences in risk aversion. This is
explained by interpersonal gender beliefs: female players believe that they are
more cooperative than men, and hence they act more cooperatively than male
players who believe that they are less cooperative than women. Second, we find
that women who are given the information that the other players are also female
cooperate more than women and men who do not receive information about the
sex of their partners. This, then, is explained by interpersonal gender beliefs: fe-
male players will cooperate more when they are given the information that their
partners are also female, because they are socialised into cooperation with other
women. At the same time, we found that male players do not cooperate so much
more when being informed that their partners are male. This can be explained
on the one hand through socialisation: men have less personal experience with
men’s cooperativeness compared to women with women’s cooperativeness. On
the other hand we can explain this by referring to the interaction of gender
beliefs and status beliefs, which lead men to reassert their higher status by not
adopting stereotype feminine behaviour in interactions with other men, but to
reassert their masculinity through continuing with more competitive behaviour
rather than cooperative behaviour.
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